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1. Air transport liberalization: the consequences for airports. 
A key question that so far has received relatively little attention in the germane literature is 
that of the changes at various airports as a result of the EU liberalization policies. That is, 
presently, most major European airports still benefit fiom the so-called home-carrier 
phenomenon where the country's publicly or semi-publicly owned carrier uses the country's 
main airport as its gateway hub and, consequently, the home-carrier is also the principal user 
of this airport (in terms of proportion of total aircraft movements, number of passengers 
transported, connections, slots ownership, etc.). The country's main airport has substantially 
benefited fiom these monopoly conditions of airline captivity, strongly determined by the 
bilateral system of international air transport regulation. Therefore European major airports 
were used to operate in essentially different markets, compared to the increasingly competitive 
markets of their home based carriers. This partly explains relative stability of transport 
volumes and financial results of European major airports compared to the relatively volatile 
financial results of most European national airlines. 
However the liberalization of European aviation is likely to change this situation. Market 
access is open now to all community carriers, i.e. carriers with majority ownership and 
effective control in the hands of EU citizens. Ticket prices are fiee, governments can only 
intervene in case of dumping or excessive pricing. A community airline can choose its seat in 
any of the 15 member states. Licensing procedures are harmonized between member states. 
Since a few months community carriers have unrestricted route access within the EU. 
Most probably this development will be extended to countries inside and outside Europe. Last 
year the European Commission got the mandate to start negotiations with 10 other European 
countries. In the meantime the EC has also started negotiations with the USA on so-called soft 
rights. In the meantime open skies agreements have been concluded between the USA and 
most of the EU member states to facilitate strategic alliances between airlines of the states 
involved. 
As a result of this on-going liberalization the model of the single 'national' carrier using the 
national home base as its single hub for the designated third, fourth and sixth freedom 
operations will stepwise disappear. Within the EU the concept of the national carrier has 
already been replaced by that of the community carrier. State ownership in more and more 
European carriers is reduced. On the longer run mergers or even bankruptcy will further 
undermine the 'single national carrier - single national hub' model in Europe. In the meantime 
strategic alliances between national carriers in Europe will already reduce the airlines' loyalty 
to a single airport. Profit maximization and accountability to share holders will supersede the 
loyalty of these newly emerging alliances, probably looking for the opportunities of a multiple 
hub network to adequately cover the whole European market. 
As a consequence some European airports might see a substantial decline in arriving, 
departing and transfer traffic, thus in revenues and financial solvency, as well as in their 
connection to other inter-continental and intra-European destinations. At the same time other 
airports might realize a significant increase in traffic as they will be sought after by the profit 
maximizing airlines as their major gateway hubs. Which will be the loosing airports and 
which will be the winning ones? Can airports anticipate the actions of airlines in deregulated 
markets and utilize policies which will improve their relative position? If so, what should be 
these anticipatory policies? These questions become the more urgent, since an increasing 
number of major European airports will be privatized in the near future. Although increasing 
airport congestion in Europe will also be reflected in a growing demand pressure for airport 
slots, this is not a guarantee for a stable transport volume growth of individual airports. The 
more volatile the market is, the more vulnerable privatized airports become. 
Therefore the main issue of this study is the analysis of the opportunities of major European 
airports to become a central hub as a result of the network choices made by the new European 
airlines in a completely liberalized market. 
In a previous study (Berechman and de Wit, 1996), we already explored the potential of 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol of becoming the major West-European hub, once European 
aviation markets are deregulated. A major hindrance of that study was the use of a single hub- 
and-spoke network. For example that model could not analyze the viability of different 
combinations of European hubs within a multiple hub network of alternative airline alliances. 
In this study we have formulated the model of a multi-hub network where fwo West-European 
airports are used for inter-continental and intra-European travel to enable a more realistic 
analysis of hub choice. 
Like the previous one also this multi-hub model is primarily used to assess the potential 
ability of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for becoming a major West-European hub. Thus in 
particular the policy tests focus on this airport in a double hub network. 
2. The Economic Model and Mathematical Program 
In this section we first describe the microeconomic model on which the mathematical program 
is based. 
2.1 The Economic Model 
The observed phenomenon of increased hubbing, following the USA aviation market 
deregulation, has long been the subject of in-depth analysis in the germane literature. In 
general, the question is under what conditions will an airline's profit be greater when it uses a 
Hub and Spoke (HS) network vs. a Fully Connected (FC) network. The advantages of the HS 
network structure can be divided into three main branches (see Berechman and de Wit, 1996, 
for a detailed analysis): 
Cost Economies: A number of authors have argued that cost considerations, mainly 
economies of aircraft size coupled with scope economies, underlie the intensified use of HS 
networks. 
Demand-Side Effects: Demand-side effects are another argument to explain the 
intensified use of HS network following deregulation. Two types of explanation fall under this 
approach: (a) demand elasticities relative to airfare and travel time; and (b) product 
differentiation in departure times. 
Market Dominance: analysis shows that given the proper conditions the incumbent 
airline will operate a HS network when faced with the threat of entry, thus successfully 
obstructing entry. 
In this study we adopt all three types of explanation by considering a hypothetical airline, 
which operates in a deregulated market, and which strives to maximize profits and gain 
market dominance by structuring its network as a hub-and-spoke. In doing so it takes 
advantage of demand and network cost economies. On each route it sets airfare, output level 
(number of passengers and frequency), and employs aircraft capacity in a way that deters entry 
by potential rival airlines. In structuring its HS network, the airIine chooses as main hubs 
those airports which best contribute to its profits. The analytical model, which is embedded in 
the simulation model, explicitly contains all these elements. 
It should be re-emphasized however, that in this study we do not regard a pure HS network. 
Instead, we consider two main hubs that can serve as intercontinental gateway hubs, intra- 
European hubs, or both. (See for example figure 1 and 2). 
On the demand side, the utility of a business or non-business passenger traveling on the route 
from node i to node j is based on the airfare, frequency of flights and whether or not the flight 
is direct or indirect. If a passenger is flying indirectly, he or she must fly from node i to node j 
via one or two hubs because no direct link exists in the network configuration chosen. The 
utility is then measured according to the lowest frequency along any one of the maximal three 
1 2 3 
legs of the route required ( i j  hubl + hub2 + j ) .  As can be seen from the theoretical model 
(Berechman et al, 1995), this ensures non-entry of airlines that may consider providing a 
direct service between two nodes, at present unconnected, since the airfare paid will be low 
enough to render entry uneconomical. 
It is assumed that the airline's operating cost function can be defined as a standard CES 
function. This class of function is general enough to capture the cost of operating different 
types of networks with a varying number of routes and layout patterns. It is monotonically 
increasing and exhibits increasing returns. This ensures scale economies in that as output 
(frequency, or ACM per week) increases, the cost per flight decreases. Therefore it is 
worthwhile increasing frequency in a HS system in order to deter entry into the marketplace 
by carriers attempting to provide a direct service from i to j, where this route does not 
presently exist. 
Additional costs result from payments made by the airline to the airports in the form of 
landing and passenger charges. The landing charges (LC) are paid to the amval airport and are 
based on the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft size. The LC per route is computed by 
multiplying the Maximum Take-Off Weight of the aircraft size chosen, by the cost per ton of 
landing at the specific airport, by the frequency per week. The passenger charges (PC) are paid 
to the departure airport for each passenger camed. Two passenger charges have been 
included: the full tariff paid at the first departure airport and a transfer charge paid at 
subsequent hubs, when the passenger is carried on two or more legs to reach her destination. 
This pricing system is in line with the present rules of most international airports. Since there 
are many different types of charges, the LC and PC have been modified to include other 
relevant charges such as night charges and noise charges etc. and will be referred to as landing 
related and passenger related charges. 
The Airline's Objective Function: Given a particular hub airport, the airline's objective 
function consists of the revenue the airline earns from passengers that travel directly to their 
destination and are therefore willing to pay an additional charge, and those that travel via the 
hub. The costs defined in the objective function include the operational cost function and 
landing and passenger related charges at this hub. The profit function is thus defined as: 
Profit Function = Revenue Function 
- Operating Costs Function 
- Landing Charges 
- Passenger Charges 
Recall that in this analysis we consider networks with two primary hubs. Therefore, the 
optimization model produces a solution to the profit function in terms of the potential 
profitability of the network with these hubs. By repeating the analysis for all possible 
networks the model sets the one with the highest level of profits to equal 100 and 
subsequently, ranks all other networks accordingly. I 
2.2. Mathematical Program 
The mathematical program consists of the above-mentioned objective fimction and four types 
of constraints that have been included in the program as follows: 
Type 1: Aircrafi Capacity Constraint 
This restricts the size of the aircraft to a minimum and a maximum number of seats. 
Type 2: Airport Capaciy 
Airport capacity in terms of aircraft movements per unit of time (e.g. ACM per week) is 
affected by three components; runway, terminaI and apron capacity. Runway capacity proved 
to be the most binding restriction in all cases, consequently other constraint types were 
redundant. 
Type 3: Load Factor Minimal Capacity 
This constraint requires a minimum percentage of seats filled (load factor) at all times, since 
the industry has an accepted minimal level, below which the airline will not break even. 
Type 4: Network Constraint 
The last set of constraints requires all frequency levels to be positive, ensuring that all nodes 
are connected in the network configuration specified. 
The algorithm that solves the mathematical program searches for a solution using a 
modification of Goldfarb's conjugate-gradient projection algorithm for a non-linear objective 
h c t i o n  with linear constraints. The algorithm has been modified to deal with a set of non- 
' The choice of a network (thus hubs) is also based on the quality level of these hubs to indicate additional costs 
associated with the use of these airports (e.g., costs due to delays, congestion and handling).. Therefore, 
schematically the ranking of a network is: 
Network Ranking = Profitability Rank + Quality Score o f  Hub I and of Hub 2 
Analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this study and is the main theme of a follow-up study. 
linear constraints that require the load factor to be above a certain percentage in a feasible 
solution. (Adler et al., 1996). 
3. Network Structure 
In this study two internodal demand matrices, one for business and one for non-business, have 
been composed for 18 major European airports (resulting in 16 routes to be assigned to the 
two airports selected as hubs), a U.S. airport JFK and a Far-East airport NRT. We assume 
that all North-Atlantic traffic is aggregated into one international route (i.e. all North- 
American departures first fly to New York and then to a West-European hub). Similarly all 
Far-East routes are first connected to Tokyo and then to a West-European hub. In the 
simulation model it is possible to distribute the 2 inter-continental and the 16 European routes 
in any order (e.g. the two international routes to one hub and the 16 European airports evenly 
distributed between the two hubs), though a geographical distribution seems most sensible 
(see Figures 1 and 2). 
So the structure of the network is determined by three factors: a) the location of the major 
hubs; b) the number of intra-European routes and inter-continental routes that are connected to 
each hub; c) the allocation of European routes between the hubs. In this analysis we 
distinguish between two types of hub: a gateway-hub and a Euro-hub. A gateway hub is a 
point of transfer between inter-continental routes and intra-European routes. In this regard, a 
gateway hub has a feeder function by feeding the intra-European network with inter- 
continental passengers (e.g. long-haul: New York = Amsterdam * Zurich), vice versa. A 
Euro-hub, is a transfer point connecting short-haul to short-haul routes inside Europe. The 
same airport can, of course, serve the two functions but what counts is the proportion of trips 
that are long- or short-haul. 
Figure 1 shows a base case where all 16 European routes are distributed between an 
intercontinental hub (e.g. London) and an intra-European hub (e.g. Milan) whereby all North- 
Atlantic and Far-East international routes go to London. The division of the European routes 
is geographically based, i.e., all airports east of Milan are linked to Milan whereas all airports 
west of Milan with London. A shuttle service links the main two hubs. 
Figure 2 shows a case where each hub connects with one international route (North-Atlantic 
with London and Far-East with Milan). 
4. Base Run Simulation 
Above we have defined a network by its main hubs and by the distribution of international and 
intra-European routes between these hubs. It should be understood that the simulation model 
is flexible enough to handle any assumed network configuration. The ones described below 
serve mainly as examples. 
We begin by presenting the results from, what we call, the "base run simulation". The choice 
of the following 13 networks in this base run simulation was made on the grounds that airlines 
AMS, ARN, ATH, BCN, BRU, CDG, CPH, FBU, FCO, FRA, GVA, LHR, LIN, MAD, MAN, MUC, VIE, 
ZRH. 
that use these hubs are potential alliances and that fiom geographical and demand 
considerations it is useful to distribute the intra-European routes as in the networks below. In 
each case, the 16 European routes have been split evenly between the two designated hubs, 
based on geographical considerations (distance to nearest hub). The two international routes 
are allocated to one hub which represents the international gateway (the one chosen provides 
the airline with the highest profits)3. The key parameters to notice are the potential profits of 
the (hypothetical) airline from using a particular network and the relative ranking of this 
network. Profits or losses to an airport are also noted. In some cases, however, these profits 
are fiom ACM and PAX related income and costs only as no information is available on the 
fixed income and costs of a particular airport. It is important to emphasize that it is not 
possible to attribute any "real-world" meaning to the numerical results fiom the simulations 
which stem from theoretical conditions of network choice and market structure under 
complete deregulation. 
In this section we report only principal results from the base-run simulation. Two main 
conclusions can be derived from the results of table 1. First, the networks which contain 
London (Heathrow) as one of their hubs rank the highest in terms of airline's potential profits. 
In this base run simulation, the choice of London (LHR) and Rome (FCO) as the main hubs 
proves to be potentially the most profitable one (potential profit rank = 100). Amsterdam 
receives second ranking only when it is part of the network that includes London (potential 
profit rank = 86). 
A second conclusion is that when an airline designs a profitable network, the hubs in this 
network do not necessarily earn positive profits. For example, in the case of the London 
(LHR) and Rome (FCO) network, which earn the airline the highest potential profits, Rome 
airport suffers a loss. Apparently, what is good for the airline is not necessarily good for the 
airports. The question, what can an airport do in order to increase its use without suffering a 
loss, will be further explored in policy analysis section. 
5. Policy Tests 
5.1. Objectives of Policy Tests 
There are two main objectives for the policy tests. The first is to examine the network choice 
and performance of airlines and of airports under varying external conditions. The second 
objective is to determine optimal policy for Amsterdam airport Schiphol with respect to traffic 
and financial performance. 
In terms of the simulation model, attainment of the first objective requires that we introduce 
into the program changes in basic demand and operating conditions and, subsequently, a 
comparison of the model's results with those obtained from the base run. Attainment of the 
second objective requires a search process by which the best combination of policy means 
available to Schiphol (e.g. change in ACM and PAX charges) is identified. 
One might expect that the gateway hub will serve all 16 European routes due to inter Gateway-European 
transfer flows. We have thus run these networks on the basis of  demand considerations alone. The results were 
quite similar in terms of profit to the airline. 
Table 1 .  Summary of the Results &om the Base Run Simulation 
Potential Profit in S's routes assigned Relative Position 
- to airline 
hub 1 - to hub 1 
hub 2 - to hub 2 
- to hub 1 
- to hub 2 
Network 
airline 
ZRB 
AHS 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
airline 
IRA 
nan 
3 3  
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
airline 
m 
AM9 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
airline 
LBR 
FCO 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
airline 
PC0 
AMS 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Airline 
BRU 
ZRR 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Airline 
CPH 
CDC 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Airline 
CPK 
I1U 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Airline 
CPH 
m 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Airline 
LHR 
BRU 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Airline 
LRR 
IRA 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Airline 
CDG 
K O  
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
Airline 
LRR 
Ans 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 2 
Euro: 9 Interc'l: 0 
The following policy tests were performed: 
(A) effect of doubling demand; 
(B) effect of doubling demand and increasing airport capacity; 
(C) effect of decreasing landing charges (at Schiphol); 
(D) effect of decreasing passenger charges (at Schiphol); 
(E) effect of a change in a mix of policies on Schiphol's position; 
Two additional policy tests focused on the effects of changes in network structure on 
Schiphol's position. 
(F) effect of splitting international routes; 
(G) effect of changing intra-European routes; 
In many of these tests the introduction of an exogenous change is also likely to affect the 
quality of airports from the point of view of airlines which, in turn, could affect their choice of 
a primary hub. Since in this study we did not model airlines' reaction to changes in airport 
quality attributes, we disregard airports' quality effects arising from these policy changes. As 
mentioned above, such an analysis is the subject of a follow-up study. Below we report the 
major findings from these policy tests. 
5.2. Policy Test Results 
A. Effect of Doubling. Demand: the demand data used here represents approximately 45% of 
actual demand. The reason being that in Europe non-scheduled and charter operations 
constitute a very large proportion of total demand. In addition, in this study we have used only 
18 European airports (albeit the major ones), thereby not considering trips from smaller 
airports. To account for this discrepancy and to assess the effect of future growing demand we 
have doubled both the business and non-business demand matrices. Compared with the base- 
run the results show that while the network with London (LHR) - Rome (FCO) as its hubs still 
ranks the highest, other networks become a viable option. Thus, for example, whereas in the 
base- run London (LHR) - Brussels (BRU) ranked fifth after London (LHR) - Rome (FCO), 
now it ranks second. On the other hand, the network London (LHR) - Amsterdam (AMS) 
which ranked second in the base-run is now down to fifth position. Apparently, as demand 
increases the strategic position of other airports (such as Brussels in combination with 
London) becomes an attractive option for airlines. This conclusion should be qualified, 
however, as we did not consider the effect of greater demand on congestion and delays, thus 
on the attractiveness of airports fiom airlines' viewpoint. 
B. Effect of Doubling. Demand and Increasing Aimort Cauacitv: It can be seen fiom the 
doubled demand test results that certain airports are used to their full capacity. One solution is 
to expand runway capacity. Of the 5 major airports in our study, London (LHR) and Frankfurt 
are unlikely to see any increase in runway capacity. Amsterdam, Paris (CDG) and possibly 
Brussels, can expect such a development4. Thus, in this policy test the runway capacity of 
these 3 airports is increased according to their projected capacity per week in the year 2000 
(SRI, 199 1) as follows: 
* In cases where it is not possible to increase capacity the solutions to congestion will be either decline in service 
level (e.g. longer delays) or higher charges, or both. 
Hub Original Runway Runway Capacity 
Aimort Cavacitv for the vear 2000 
Amsterdam 1 1,424 15,120 
Brussels 7,392 10,080 
Charies de Gaulle 12,096 12,600 
The main conclusion fiom this analysis is that compared with the previous test (A) the 
position of Amsterdam will not improve while that of Paris (CDG) will (compare, for 
example the positions of CDG - FCO and LHR - AMS in tests A and B). The profit level of 
different networks might change as well but in evaluating these results it should be point out 
that we did not account for the capital costs of these capacity development projects and their 
possible effect on airlines' costs. 
C. Effect of Decreasing Landing Charges (at Schivhol): In this study we have lumped all 
charges into two main categories: landing or Aircraft Movement (ACM) and Passengers 
(PAX) charges. In general, all charges need to be approved by governmental authorities thus, 
except for inflation adjustments, the margins for a change are rather limited. However, as 
explained above, our objective is to examine the effect of charges on network structure and 
the choice of a particular hub, independent of how applicable is this policy at present. To that 
end, in this test we reduce ACM charges at Schiphol by 15 percent. Compared with the base- 
run the results from this test indicate no effect on Schiphol's ranking (LHR - AMS is second 
place in both cases) with a slight improvement in potential profits for airlines (due to the drop 
in charge costs). 
D. Effect of Decreasing Passenger Charges fat Schi~hol): In the following policy test we have 
decreased Schiphol's passenger related (PAX) charges, for both transfer and non-transfer 
passengers, by 15%. The results show that decreasing PAX charges has little to no effect on 
the outcomes (Schiphol's ranking and airlines' profits). Compared with the results of test C, 
decreasing Schiphol's landing charges by 15% has a greater impact on the airlines' profits 
than a decrease of PAX charges of a similar magnitude. In either case, decreasing charges has 
no effect on the ranking of preferable networks. 
E. Effect of a Change in a Mix of Policies on Schi~hol's Position: In this test we examined the 
combined effect of completely eliminating all charges at Schiphol (i.e., ACM and PAX 
charges are set to zero) while concurrently doubling demand everywhere. The main 
conclusion from this test is that demand has a much greater impact on network ranking and 
profitability than charges have. Compared with the results of test A, the decline in Schiphol's 
charges has improved the airline's level of potential profits but did not affect its relative 
ranking. 
F. Effect of Splitting International Routes: In the base case analysis the two international 
routes (New York (JFK) and Tokyo (NRT)) are connected to one hub (the European gateway 
hub, e.g., London) while the other airport serves as an intra-European main hub. In this case 
each of the two hubs is connected to one of the two international hubs in order to determine 
the effect on potential profits and network ranking. The results (shown in Appendix F) imply 
that, based on potential profits, the splitting of the international routes reduces overall 
profitability, compared with the base-run's results. Hence, from this perspective this is not a 
preferable approach. From network ranking point of view the network London (LHR) 
connected to JFK and Amsterdam (AMS) connected to NRT is superior (in terms of potential 
profits) to the network London (LHR) connected to JFK and Rome (FCO) connected to NRT 
which seems, fiom geographical viewpoint, to be the more logical one (than LHR connected 
to Tokyo and FCO connected to New York). 
G. Effect of Chan~ing Intra-European Routes: In the base case analysis each of the two main 
hubs is connected to 9 intra-European routes. The objective of this test is to ascertain whether 
a different split of these routes will affect potential profitability and ranking. Hence, in this 
run, the European domestic routes are alternately split 7 to 11 between the two European hubs 
(as well as between the two international routes). Compared with the base-run results, in 
general, profit level has been increased after this split. For example LHR - FCO weekly 
potential profit level has risen from $92.7 million in the base-run to $100.5 million. In this 
regard this policy is a preferable one. From network ranking viewpoint, Schiphol's position is 
not improved as another network, London (LHR) - Frankfurt (FRA) has a higher ranking. It 
is possible, of course, to test for any other routes' split to find out whether Schiphol's position 
can indeed be considerably improved. 
Table 2. Summary of Policy Tests: Selected Results " 
I I I I 
B 1 Doubling Demand and I LHR FCO 1 100 1 FCO AMS 
Test Type 
Base Run 
A Doubling Demand 
C 
D 
E 
I Routes I I I 
Note: a These results do not take into account possible changes in the quality level of airports resultinl 
these policies; The combination LHR-FCO while ranking first, is somewhat doubtful from geographic 
viewpoint as it requires LHR to be connected to Tokyo (NRT) and FCO to be connected to New York 
Airline's Best Network Choice 
5.3 Summary of The Policy Tests 
Hubs 
LHR FCO 
Schiphol' Best Position 
LHR FCO 
increasing Airport Capacity 
Decreasing Schiphol's 
Landing Charges 
Decreasing Schiphol's 
Passengers Charges 
Mix of Policies 
I 
kom 
11 
JFK) 
Rank 
100 
Hubs 
LHR AMS 
F 
G 
As the focus of this study is on the effect of alternative policies on airlines' choice of best 
network (in terms of primary hubs) and on the position of Amsterdam (Schiphol) airport, the 
following table summarizes the main results fiom the above policy analyses. 
Rank Position 
86 2 
100 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
LHR AMS 
LHR AMS 
LHR FCO 
LHR FCO 
Splitting International 
Routes 
Changing Intra-European 
97 
100 
FCO AMS 
100 
100 
100 
77 4 
LHR AMS 
LHR AMS 
FCO AMS 
Several conclusions can be drawn fiom these results. First, the combination of London (LHR) 
and Rome (FCO) airports appears to be superior, in terms of its potential ability to generate 
profits for airlines, under all policy test conditions (save for the implausible case of test F). 
This is mainly due to the very strong position of London's Heathrow airport in Europe and the 
effective geographical division of European routes between London and Rome. 
The second conclusion is that the dominant factor af'fecting potential profitability and ranking 
of airports are actual demand patterns. Given demand elasticities, when more passengers use 
an airport as their origin or destination airport, the greater is the propensity of airlines to use 
this airport as their primary hub. It further seems that the demand factor supersedes many 
possible policy options like reducing landing and passenger charges. As suggested by the 
results of test A, if demand for air travel will indeed grow, (e.g., due to reduction in airfare 
following the European aviation deregulation), Schiphol's position is likely to decline as other 
airports, like Brussels and Paris (CDG), are more likely to be selected by airlines as their 
primary European hubs. This tendency will be further intensified if these other airports will 
also increase their runway capacity (see results of test B). A plausible corollary to this 
conclusion is that if Schiphol airport wishes to improve its relative position it needs to 
increase demand for its services relative to other airports. One sensible way of doing so is by 
expanding its catchment area, for example, by improving rail and bus link services to it. 
A third conclusion is that the intercontinental linkages of an airport play an important role in 
determining its relative position. This can be seen from the results of test F which indicate that 
the combination of London (linked to New York (JFK)) and Amsterdam (linked to Tokyo 
(NRT)) is a viable alternative to the London-Rome combination. In general, it is the airlines 
which decide on the structure of their network and connectivity to international hubs. 
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